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Channeling Contraband: How States Shape
International Smuggling Routes
Max Gallien and Florian Weigand
ABSTRACT
Although smuggling is commonly assumed to happen in
remote and difficult-to-access borderlands, in reality, smuggling
is most prevalent in areas that states tightly control, including
at formal border crossings. To understand this puzzle, this article
explores the relationship between states and smugglers at inter-
national borders. Based on extensive empirical research in vari-
ous borderlands in North Africa and Southeast Asia, it argues
that different kinds of smugglers prefer different types of rela-
tionships with the state. The article outlines six ideal types of
such relationships. It contends that these types of relationships
are the dominant factor in how different smuggling networks
choose routes along a border. The findings have implications
for our understanding of smuggling and policies that aim at
addressing smuggling, especially regarding the effects of border
fortifications and corruption prevention.
For over 400 kilometers, the border between Tunisia and Libya stretches
across deserts, lakes, and mountains. The border provides a source of
income for one of the largest smuggling economies in North Africa, with
trading in everything from gasoline, fabrics, and electronics to cigarettes
and narcotics. Its length and terrain make the border difficult to control
for both Tunisian and Libyan security forces, and offer plenty of opportu-
nities for the thousands of smugglers who cross the border every day to
stay undetected or leverage their superior knowledge of the terrain in high-
speed car chases with soldiers and customs officers. And yet, most of these
smugglers have chosen two particular points in the border to conduct their
business: the formal border crossings as Ras Jedir and Dhiba. In fact, differ-
ent smuggling networks prefer different routes: while those trading in
mobile phones, bananas, or alcohol have typically preferred to play cat and
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mouse with the soldiers through the desert, those trading in gasoline, car-
pets, or microwaves have preferred the official border crossings.
Similarly, the border between Thailand and Malaysia stretches across
mountains and rough terrains, making large parts difficult to control and
monitor. An ongoing violent conflict on the Thai side of the border adds
another layer of complexity when navigating the territory. However, some
parts of the border, such as in the province of Narathiwat, are more easily
accessible and well connected on both the Thai and Malaysian sides of the
border. Because of the ongoing conflict and accessibility factors, the border
here is very securitized, with an elevated presence of soldiers, police officers,
and border guards. Nonetheless, this part of the border is a particularly
popular spot with smugglers, preferred over the less controlled but more dif-
ficult to access paths in the countryside. At the Golok River, which defines
the border between Thailand and Malaysia in Narathiwat, large warehouses
are a prominent sight on both banks. Small ships, heavily loaded with
smuggled T-shirts, rice, cooking oil, cigarettes, alcohol, and in some cases
drugs, go back and forth between the warehouses in the two countries, often
only meters away from the official border crossings. Although security forces
are very present, they do not intervene; the owners of the warehouses pay a
monthly Flat Rate “fee,” which allows them to smuggle as much as they can.
What makes some smuggling networks choose to operate at points of max-
imum state control, while others prefer to stay off its radar? This article
explores how the relationship between smuggling networks and state structures
shapes smuggling routes. We argue that beyond geography or border security
infrastructure, the nature of the interaction between smugglers and state struc-
tures is the most powerful predictor of the routes through which different
smuggling networks prefer to operate. At the heart of our argument stands the
observation that most smuggling networks do not desire to operate in an
environment where third-party rule enforcement by a local monopolist of
power is entirely absent, as they rely on some of the services that the monop-
olist provides. However, as we argue, different forms of interactions between
smugglers and state structures typically generate different costs and risks for
smuggling networks and have crucial implications for the respective smuggling
economy’s market structure. Due to different organizational capacity, access to
financial or social capital, features of the goods they transport, and risk aver-
sion, networks have heterogeneous preferences regarding their interaction with
state structures along borders, thus determining their choice of route.
This discussion implies significant stakes both for the study and practice
of border security today. Globally, the last two decades have seen an
increasing focus on border security as a critical security challenge in the
context of a globalization of crime and the risks of globally operating
armed groups. Traditional thinking about border control within security
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studies and policymaking typically relies on at least two strong assumptions
that position smugglers and state structures as antagonists. One makes the
interdiction of smuggling primarily dependent on state capacity and the
minimization of individualized corruption. The other interprets smuggling
as inherently subversive and the existence of large-scale smuggling as an
indication of state weakness and fragility. In policy practice, both are asso-
ciated with heavier investment in border security as a way to strengthen
states, especially in developing countries.1 The existence and frequency of a
wider set of interactions between state structures and smuggling networks,
and these interactions’ role in shaping smuggling routes, therefore, have
critical consequences for the analysis not just of border security in particu-
lar but also “state capacity” and “state fragility” more broadly. Here, it con-
nects to a wider set of questions about how states secure borders that
scholars of smuggling have highlighted in recent years. Critically it notes
that global investments into border infrastructure need to be analyzed not
necessarily as measures that interdict smuggling but as measures that
change the structure and routes of smuggling streams in more com-
plex ways.
To explore this argument, we utilize empirical data from a variety of bor-
derlands to develop six ideal types of interaction between smuggling net-
works and state structures: Genuine Enforcement, Toleration, Flat Rate,
States as Smugglers, Cat and Mouse, and Petty Corruption. We analyze
these interactions with respect to their desirability for different network
types. While this represents a first step in the study of typologies of smug-
gler–state relationships, it already allows us to draw conclusions regarding
the effectiveness of border security infrastructure and anti-corruption meas-
ures on combating smuggling, the features of point-of-entry smuggling,
and the effects of armed conflicts on smuggling routes.
Our analysis is built upon extensive empirical fieldwork and interviews
with both smugglers and state agents we conducted in nine different bor-
derlands between 2014 and 2018. Through its empirical strategy, the paper
aims to fill a crucial gap in the literature on border security within security
studies and the literature on smuggling more widely. Work that rests on
single case studies or regional analyses dominate these literatures, but anal-
yses that bring together borderlands across regions and continents, to build
toward larger, global arguments and theories, are extremely scarce.
The rest of the paper is divided into five sections. The first reviews some
of the existing literature on the interaction between state structures and
smuggling networks. The second presents the methodology and empirical
basis of this paper. The third section outlines a typology of different
1See, for example, Germany’s Ert€uchtigungsinitiative.
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interactions between smuggling networks and state structures. The fourth
discusses a range of implications based on this typology, and the fifth sec-
tion summarizes our overall conclusions.
Smuggling in security studies
Although the degree to which states have historically exerted control over
the porosity of their borders is commonly overstated, it has come to sym-
bolize a crucial element of state sovereignty.2 Few topics have been so
dominant in contemporary political discourse on state sovereignty and
security as the securitization—and walling—of borders.
A common assumption is that a key reason why states try to control
their borders is that they want to stop smuggling and enforce custom regu-
lations. The relationship between states and smugglers is viewed as one of
antagonists, in which states try to enforce the laws and arrest and prosecute
smugglers. Meanwhile, smugglers are assumed to be trying to evade pros-
ecution and are therefore forced to operate in the shadows. If smuggling
does nonetheless occur, according to this logic, it is the consequence of a
state lacking the capacity to enforce its rules.
This understanding of the state–smuggler relationship dominates the
security studies literature; it commonly is an implicit assumption, but in
some cases is stated explicitly. For example, scholars such as Louise I.
Shelley argue that transnational crime and terrorism flourish due to a
“decline in state capacity” and a “retreat of the state.”3 Along similar lines,
Robert I. Rotberg describes “smuggling” and “corruption” as indicators of
“state fragility,” assuming states are subverted and hollowed out through
their interaction with organized crime groups, and Ulrich Schneckener con-
siders smuggling to be a main “risk area.”4
Similarly, much traditional scholarship on global illicit trade has framed
the relationship between smugglers and states as one of enforcer and
evader. Smuggling is presented as part of an economy that is
“underground,”5 hidden, or in the “shadows,”6 and seeks to evade interac-
tions with state structures. Another set of studies characterizes the
2Peter Andreas, “Redrawing the Line: Borders and Security in the Twenty-First Century,” International Security
28, no. 2 (Fall 2003): 78–111.
3Louise I. Shelley, Dirty Entanglements: Corruption, Crime, and Terrorism (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2014), 98.
4Robert I. Rotberg, ed., When States Fail: Causes and Consequences (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2010); Ulrich Schneckener, ed., States at Risk: Fragile Staaten als Sicherheits- und Entwicklungsproblem (Berlin:
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2004).
5Ann Dryden Witte, Kelly Eakin, and Carl P. Simon, Beating the System: The Underground Economy (Boston, MA:
Praeger, 1982).
6Friedrich Schneider and Dominik H. Enste, “Shadow Economies: Size, Causes, and Consequences,” Journal of
Economic Literature 38, no. 1 (March 2000): 77–114.
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interaction between smuggling and states as one primarily created by cor-
ruption within the security services, giving rise to relationships that are typ-
ically clientelistic. From this literature has emerged a “crime-fragility
rationale”7 similar to the one in security studies.
In the policy world, based on the same understanding of the relationship
between states and smugglers, international organizations and bilateral
development programs aim at curbing smuggling and illicit trade by
strengthening the capacity of states considered to possess limited control of
their borders and weak enforcement of their customs regulations. As Ron
E. Hassner and Jason Wittenberg note, while investments into border forti-
fications designed to limit uncontrolled cross-border movements have
expanded dramatically in recent years, political science has largely neglected
the politics of border control and border porosity.8
As Peter Andreas points out, siloization of scholarship between security
studies, international relations, and international political economy has
contributed to a lack of a unified debate, divergent conceptual approaches,
and a obscuring of a discussion on the interaction between smuggling and
state structures.9 As a result, terminologies have also diverged. We use the
term “smuggling” to describe all forms of cross-border trade that violate
the formal law applicable at the respective border. We differentiate between
licit and illicit goods, with licit goods referring to those for which a legal
trade corridor exists that is not subject to additional security clearance.
Examples of illicit goods include narcotics, expired medicine, firearms,
endangered animals, or archaeological artifacts.10
More recent literature on smuggling has highlighted the existence of sta-
ble and systematic interactions between smugglers and state and nonstate
regulatory actors. For example, in her work on Somalia11 and
Afghanistan,12 Aisha Ahmad has pointed to the predictability of rules
around the taxation and regulation of the flows of illicit goods as key fac-
tors fostering mutually beneficial relationships between both nonstate
armed groups and protostates. One of us has noted elsewhere that smug-
gling in North Africa is commonly structured through impersonal institu-
tions that are negotiated between state institutions and smuggling
7Christoph Heuser, “The Effect of Illicit Economies in the Margins of the State – The VRAEM,” Journal of Illicit
Economies and Development 1, no. 1 (2019): 23–36.
8Ron E. Hassner and Jason Wittenberg, “Barriers to Entry: Who Builds Fortified Boundaries and Why?”
International Security 40, no. 1 (Summer 2015): 157–90.
9Peter Andreas, “International Politics and the Illicit Global Economy,” Perspectives on Politics 13, no. 3
(September 2015): 782–88.
10Our discussion here focuses on the smuggling of goods and excludes human trafficking and
migrant smuggling.
11Aisha Ahmad, “The Security Bazaar: Business Interests and Islamist Power in Civil War Somalia,” International
Security 39, no. 3 (Winter 2014/15): 89–117.
12Aisha Ahmad, Jihad & Co.: Black Markets and Islamist Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).
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networks.13 Similarly, the literature on war economies points to more struc-
tured engagements between smugglers and state structures.14
These findings overlap with an expansive anthropological literature, par-
ticularly on African borderlands, that has chronicled how interactions
between state and nonstate actors in borderlands have generated forms of
order not sufficiently described by evasion or corruption.15 The insights of
these studies have not been appropriately reflected in security studies and
its thinking on borders. In addition, while the anthropological literature
contains significant work on the relationships between smugglers and state
officials at borders, efforts to create structured typologies of these relation-
ships16 and theorize their effects on state structures, the effects of border
fortifications, and smuggling routes are lacking. This paper aims to address
this gap.
Methodology
Empirical work on smuggling and informal and illicit forms of regulation
provides unique methodological challenges.17 Understanding practices that
are frequently hidden, misrepresented, or conducted at the very periphery
of the state requires deep contextual knowledge and access to local net-
works. As a result, the study of the illicit suits itself particularly well to
ethnographic methodologies and has been dominated by single
case studies.
We follow this practice in the field by also drawing extensively on ethno-
graphic methods: the data collected for this paper is the result of political
ethnography, interviews, and historical institutional analyses. This has
allowed us to trace practices that are commonly unwritten and embedded
in everyday social practice, triangulate information through different forms
of data, and build relationships that allow both conducting of interviews on
13Max Gallien, “Informal Institutions and the Regulation of Smuggling in North Africa,” Perspectives on Politics 18,
no. 2 (June 2020): 492–508; Adeel Malik and Max Gallien, “Border Economies of the Middle East: Why Do They
Matter for Political Economy?” Review of International Political Economy 27, no. 3 (2020): 732–62.
14Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2006); David Keen, Complex Emergencies
(Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2008); Tim Eaton, Libya’s War Economy: Predation, Profiteering and State Weakness
(London: Chatham House, 2018); Florian Weigand, Conflict and Transnational Crime: Borders, Bullets & Business
in Southeast Asia (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2020).
15Kate Meagher, “Smuggling Ideologies: From Criminalization to Hybrid Governance in African Clandestine
Economies,” African Affairs 113, no. 453 (October 2014): 497–517; Timothy Raeymaekers, Violent Capitalism and
Hybrid Identity in the Eastern Congo: Power to the Margins (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014);
Benedikt Korf and Timothy Raeymaekers, eds., Violence on the Margins: States, Conflict, and Borderlands (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Thomas H€usken, Tribal Politics in the Borderland of Egypt and Libya (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2019); Paul Nugent, Smugglers, Secessionists and Loyal Citizens on the Ghana-Togo Frontier:
The Life of the Borderlands since 1914 (Oxford: James Currey, 2002).
16With the notable exception of the work of Gregor Dobler: Dobler, “The Green, the Grey and the Blue: A
Typology of Cross-Border Trade in Africa,” Journal of Modern African Studies 54, no. 1 (March 2016): 145–69.
17See, for example, Stephen Ellis and Janet MacGaffey, “Research on Sub-Saharan Africa’s Unrecorded
International Trade: Some Methodological and Conceptual Problems,” African Studies Review 39, no. 2
(September 1996): 19–41.
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such sensitive topics and the contextualization of their content. In this we
follow a recent trend in political science that has advocated for the use of
political ethnographies, especially in the study of the illicit.18
We do not, however, limit our analysis to a single case study. This paper
draws on data collected in different borderlands across two continents,
focusing on Southeast Asia and Africa. In this, we aim to contribute to the
use of comparative methods in the study of smuggling and highlight that
the patterns discussed in this paper are not limited to a particular geo-
graphic, cultural, or political context. The borderlands considered here
have been selected following two broad considerations. One was the ease of
access and the ability to conduct sensitive research in these environments,
which has been facilitated by our research experience in these areas. The
other was a desire to include a set of borderlands that is sufficiently diverse
to be able to examine the dynamics discussed here in varying environ-
ments. The borderlands presented here vary in their geographic position
and geological makeup, and include what Gregor Dobler referred to as
“green,” “grey,” and “blue” borders.19 They include urban and rural border-
lands, the existence and absence of formal checkpoints, and varying posi-
tions within wider global licit and illicit trade corridors.
The analysis conducted here draws on author-collected data through
over two years of field research conducted between 2014 and 2018 in nine
borderlands: Bangladesh–Myanmar; Myanmar–China; Myanmar–Thailand;
Thailand–Malaysia; Malaysia–Indonesia; Indonesia–Philippines;
Tunisia–Libya; Morocco–Algeria; and Morocco–Spain. In these border-
lands, we have conducted over 350 qualitative interviews with smugglers,
bureaucrats, local security forces, civil society activists, politicians, and jour-
nalists. This has been supported through participant observations at border
crossings and in informal markets across the borderlands.20
Naturally, conducting qualitative and ethnographic fieldwork on smug-
gling networks and in borderlands presents a wide set of methodological
challenges. As a full review of these challenges goes beyond the scope of
18Lisa Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1999); Lisa Wedeen, “Reflections on Ethnographic Work in Political Science,”
Annual Review of Political Science 13 (2010): 255–72; Edward Schatz, ed., Political Ethnography: What Immersion
Contributes to the Study of Power (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009); Erica S. Simmons and Nicholas
Rush Smith, “Comparison with an Ethnographic Sensibility,” PS: Political Science & Politics 50, no. 1 (January
2017): 126–30.
19Dobler, “The Green, the Grey and the Blue.”
20As smuggling typically is a dynamic activity, it is worth noting that the dynamics described here may have
shifted since their observation in the context of this project. For example, by the time of writing, large parts
of the smuggling activities between Morocco and both Algeria and the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla
have collapsed. However, as the purpose of this paper is to point to the diversity of arrangements, we do not
believe this detracts from the arguments made here.
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this paper, we highlight three central aspects here and note how they have
affected the data collection and analysis of this project.21
First, in working with borderland communities and smugglers and secur-
ity forces in these borderlands, gaining access and building trust are com-
mon challenges for researchers. In the context of our research, these
challenges have primarily been mitigated through building relationships
over time, through repeated and extensive engagement with interlocutors,
as well as the mediation of local intermediaries. Long-term and repeated
research in the regions, as well as a combination of lengthy interviews and
participant observation, has also helped us better understand how to frame
questions about smuggling and illegal activities without suggesting judg-
ment or disapproval, which has further helped build trusting relationships.
Here, the existence of structured relationships between smugglers and
security forces in the borderlands that we describe below has helped the
data collection somewhat, as some activities have been normalized and tol-
erated enough that participants did not fear detection or exposure by talk-
ing with us about their activities.
Second, however, given the illegality of many of the activities involved,
protecting the security and anonymity of participants is crucial in conduct-
ing qualitative fieldwork on smuggling. Common mitigation strategies in
this project have included focusing in interviews on questions around
structures rather than individuals to avoid pressing participants on personal
data (for example, by asking not for the name of a supplier but whether
someone typically uses the same supplier).
Third, despite all mitigation strategies, from long-standing relationships
to careful question development questions and an effort to speak to diverse
informants and groups, we recognize that misreporting and gaps in our
access are still substantive challenges in research on this issue and our own
data collection. Although we have sought to extensively triangulate the
observations on which we base our argument, data verification was a key
challenge due to the nature of our research subject. However, we are confi-
dent, due to the wider focus and inductive approach of this article, that the
broader patterns we describe are robust to the empirical challenges in the
more particular case observations.
As is fitting for its purpose and subject matter, this paper is built on an
inductive research design. We begin by mapping six patterns of relation-
ships between smuggling networks and states and then draw on these pat-
terns to analyze deeper drivers and implications.
21For additional details on the data collection in the projects that feed into these arguments, see Max Gallien,
“Smugglers and States: Illegal Trade in the Political Settlements of North Africa” (PhD diss., London School of
Economics and Political Science, 2020); Weigand, Conflict and Transnational Crime.
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Ideal types
Conducting extensive field research in different borderlands across the
world, and drawing on ethnographic case studies of smuggling from a var-
iety of fields, we repeatedly found the same structuring patterns of state–s-
muggler interactions. These patterns, presented below, can be seen as “ideal
types” of state–smuggler interactions. Drawing on Max Weber’s under-
standing, ideal types constitute methodological utopia—models that help us
categorize and systematize empirical observations.22 However, going
beyond Weber, the suggested categories also aim to explain why state–s-
muggler interactions are structured in a particular way, constituting pat-
terns of explanations (Erkl€arungsmuster). It is important to note that
Erkl€arungsmuster can overlap or exist in parallel in an empirical setting.
For instance, different state authorities may engage differently with differ-
ent smugglers in the same border region, or the same state authority may
engage differently with different smugglers.
Before turning to the typology, some caveats are in order. We outline
patterns of interaction between smugglers and states as snapshots of a
wider interaction, which may change over time. Our intent is neither to
claim that these relationships are stable, nor provide a complete explan-
ation of the underlying factors and institutional histories that let one form
or relationship emerge in one place and a different one in another. Our
intention is instead to highlight the existence of diverse but patterned rela-
tionships and their relevance for both smugglers and states. As we present
ideal types, we also do not wish to claim that the elements of the relation-
ship between smugglers and state structures we highlight here capture the
empirical entirety. Various forms of local formal and informal institutions,
histories, shared social ties and understandings, moral conceptions, and
ambitions shape the relationships between smugglers and state institutions.
We highlight a fraction of them, as we see them pointing to patterns that
explain larger processes, but we do not lay any claim to providing an
exhaustive picture of this relationship.
From these caveats and the approach through which the ideal types have
been generated emerge some limitations for the structures presented here.
Developed based on both our field research and interactions described in
the wider literature on smuggling, the ideal types outlined here are
22What we characterize as ideal types here could, in line with Weber, also be described as Gattungsbegriffe
(class or generic concepts) that we developed inductively from our empirical findings. According to Weber,
there is a gradual transition from Gattungsbegriffe, used to classify empirical phenomena, to ideal types, which
consider “complicated historical patterns.” While empirical findings underpin our typology, it nonetheless
presents analytical utopia that overemphasize characteristics in line with Weber’s understanding of ideal types.
While we therefore decided to talk about ideal types, due to the gradual difference between Gattungsbegriff
and ideal type, either label applies for our typology. See Max Weber, “‘Objectivity’ in Social Science and Social
Policy,” in Max Weber on the Methodology of Social Sciences, ed. and trans. Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch
(Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1949 [1904]), 90–110, 101.
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primarily inductive. Consequently, they are intended to be representative
but not necessarily exhaustive. This does not limit the main claims of the
paper: that these forms of interaction present an important alternative to
simplistic antagonistic views of the relationship between smugglers and
states, and that they are central to how smuggling networks choose routes.
Room exists for the development of further ideal types or reordering of
these ideal types without detracting from these wider points.
We describe these ideal types as we see them on one side of the bor-
der—either on the exporting or importing side with respect to a particular
set of goods. This is not to imply that they are necessarily limited to one
side of the border, or that they are necessarily mirrored across the border.
Similar ideal types may appear on two sides of a border, or they may differ
dramatically upon entering another territory.
Genuine enforcement
The most common conceptualization of state–smuggler interaction is one
where state authorities genuinely try to enforce the law, and attempt to
detect and eliminate smuggling, while smugglers attempt to evade law
enforcement. Hence, smugglers avoid interaction with state authorities. If a
high level of state capacity accompanies Genuine Enforcement it makes
smuggling costly. For instance, it is costly to avoid state detection and to
find and hire people willing to take the risk. This creates high barriers of
entry to the smuggling business. Genuine Enforcement is the normative
ideal of what we usually expect states to do, and this ideal type dominates
much of the academic literature and policy discourse.
Genuine Enforcement may, for instance, be found at Singapore Changi
Airport, as the Singaporean state has the capacity and the interest to
attempt to detect drug smuggling. Similarly, gasoline smugglers in the
Moroccan cities of Oujda and Berkane told us that although customs
agents at the border were highly corruptible, their experience suggested
those agents controlling the roads further inland were following a different
regime—cars caught transporting larger quantities of contraband gasoline
would typically be confiscated alongside their wares, and the drivers
arrested. The difference in these interactions could be observed to have
shaped both the drivers and their cars. Aiming to avoid all interactions
with the state, gasoline transporters moving contraband gasoline within
Morocco would primarily drive without lights at night, at high speed, and
at tremendous risk to their health and those of other drivers. In the border-
lands of northern Morocco, this has earned them the local nickname
“muqatila”—fighter.
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Toleration
A state–smuggler interaction may also be characterized by high degrees of
Toleration. In this case, state authorities tolerate the smuggling of a certain
amount of goods and/or of particular types of goods. Hence, there is no
enforcement of formal rules that prohibit smuggling, and smugglers do not
need to pay bribes to state authorities. This is an informal, but regulated
and institutionalized, practice, which does not depend on individual officers
being on duty. This type of interaction may be driven by a lack of state
capacity to deal with all cases of smuggling. Alternatively, it may be based
on a conscious decision to enable survivalist activities and to not disrupt
the activities of small businesses and other “little fish,” such as the owners
of small shops, who smuggle daily consumption goods such as fruits, rice,
and cooking oil. At times, there may be an upper limit to the goods that
people are allowed to smuggle. Nonetheless, all people benefit from this
Toleration in the same way, as they can smuggle the same amount or kind
of goods. This ensures a high level of predictability and enables anyone to
enter the smuggling business without facing any barriers.
We observed this type of state–smuggler interaction in the case of the
Indonesia-Malaysia border region, in the Indonesian city of Nunukan in
North Kalimantan. The city is only a short boat ride from Tawau in
Malaysia. There are various small harbors in Nunukan, which we watched
being used for the legal transportation of goods and people during the
day and for the illegal transportation of goods, mainly ordinary consump-
tions goods such as gas cylinders, and migrant workers, hoping to find a
job on a palm oil plantation in Malaysia, at night. In some cases, small
police offices exist in the harbors. However, these usually only operate
during daytime and are closed at night. Hence, even if not stated offi-
cially, local Indonesian police tolerate the irregular border crossings
into Malaysia.
The border between Morocco and Algeria provides an interesting
example of this form of Toleration as well. Although the land border
between the two countries has officially been closed since 1994, smuggling
of consumer goods and the movement of people remained highly prevalent
across this border until the construction of additional fortifications in
2014. The smuggling of gasoline and consumer goods, such as textiles and
cosmetics, was largely conducted through makeshift border crossings: doors
in the border fence, which soldiers from the Moroccan military manned.
Smugglers across these gates who we spoke to recounted that from early
2011 onward, soldiers stopped taking bribes from small-scale traders while
still demanding them from wholesalers and larger traders. Smugglers them-
selves were not always in agreement about the origins of the shift, at times
speculating that it represented a response to concerns about social
CHANNELING CONTRABAND 11
instability in the region, at times interpreting it as a pro-poor policy of the
Moroccan king. Although we could not conclusively trace the precise ori-
gin of the shift, it is worth noting that it introduced, for some years, a
complete Toleration of survivalist smuggling across the border.
Flat rate
A third-way state authorities and smugglers interact can be described as a
Flat Rate model. In it, state authorities tolerate smuggling operations in
exchange for a fee that is fixed and paid on a regular basis—per crossing,
per car, or per week or month, for example—regardless of the amount of
goods smuggled (like a mobile phone provider that allows customers to
make as many phone calls as they want for a certain fixed price). The pay-
ment is not continuously negotiated; it represents an institutionalized and
regulated interaction. In a smuggling context, the payment of the fee can
either happen at the point of a border crossing or it can be arranged
beforehand. For smugglers, this model ensures a high level of predictability
regarding the costs of the smuggling operations and a low level of risk.
Meanwhile, state authorities benefit from a stable level of (additional)
income and a low level of work and enforcement activities. Contrary to the
Toleration ideal type, a required payment represents a barrier of entry—
even though the costs per item smuggled are likely to still be below the
costs of a formal trade route.
Until 2019, the Barrio Chino border crossing between Morocco and the
Spanish enclave of Melilla offered a particularly clear example of a Flat
Rate model.23 Every day, hundreds of individuals, commonly referred to by
the press as “portadores” or “human mules,” could be observed carrying
large bundles of consumer goods into Morocco: clothes, foodstuffs, cleaning
products. Their trade is illegal—the transporters do not pay any formal tax
or tariff to the Moroccan customs officers. But they also do not pay a
bribe. Most of the traders work as subcontractors for a small number of
large-scale smugglers that operate through the border crossing. As some of
the transporters pointed out to us, their wholesalers make a regular—
although illegal—payment to high-level officials within the Moroccan cus-
toms service to smuggle their goods through the crossing—a Flat Rate pay-
ment. They then mark their goods with numbers and symbols that identify
them as theirs—around the border crossing, stacks of numbered bundles
can be observed being unloaded from trucks and divided up between wait-
ing transporters. In some cases, wholesalers even hand out “tickets” to
23Smuggling through these border crossings collapsed in 2019 and 2020, largely due to interventions by the
Moroccan government.
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transporters that they can show to customs officers to identify their goods
as a particular wholesaler’s property.24
Similarly, in Narathiwat Province, in the “deep south” of Thailand at the
Malaysian border, the Flat Rate is a prominent model. As mentioned in the
introduction, large warehouses line the Golok River, which defines the bor-
der between the two countries, and small boats transport daily consump-
tion goods across it. For instance, we observed T-shirts being taken from
Thailand to Malaysia, while petrol that is considerably cheaper in Malaysia
is shipped to Thailand. This large-scale smuggling of goods often happens
near bridges, which constitute formal border crossings with customs termi-
nals and immigration counters. According to interviewed owners of such
warehouses, they often have Flat Rate deals with officials in both countries,
allowing them to transport as much as they want for a fixed fee that is
shared between the various authorities that control the border, including
customs, border police, and immigration.
State as smuggler
A fourth option is high-ranking state authorities being directly involved in
the smuggling business. In this case, state authorities fully control the
smuggling business in a particular sector or are, at the very least, the dom-
inant actor. This model is particularly prominent in cases of smuggling
illicit high-value and high-risk goods, such as drugs and guns. State author-
ities smuggle the goods themselves, they hire smugglers, or they partner
with existing smuggling networks. Detection and enforcement are only
practiced to deal with rival smugglers or smuggling networks, which refuse
to cooperate with state institutions. This imposes high costs on competitors
and can help to further monopolize the smuggling business. Here, in par-
ticular, it is worth noting that this ideal type describes the relationship on
one side of the border—which could be either the importing or exporting
side with respect to a particular good—and is not necessarily mirrored on
the other side. The smuggling of arms to a separatist movement by govern-
ment officials of a foreign country sympathetic to their cause, for example,
could see a State as Smuggler model on one side of the border and a
Genuine Enforcement environment on the other.
For instance, Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh gained widespread international
attention in 2017 after the arrival of more than 700,000 Rohingya from
Myanmar following state-driven violence against them. Cox’s Bazar is near
the Myanmar border and has long been a major transit hub for not only
refugees from Myanmar but also for smuggled licit and illicit goods. Apart
24Gallien, “Informal Institutions and the Regulation of Smuggling in North Africa.”
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from licit goods such as instant coffee, a frequently smuggled illicit good is
yaba, a methamphetamine produced in Myanmar popular in Bangladesh. It
is an open secret in Cox’s Bazar that a local former member of parliament
and member of the ruling party and his family are key players in control
of yaba smuggling from Myanmar in the area, using their state authority to
protect their smuggling business and monopolize it.25 Even interviewed
Bangladeshi army officers were afraid and stated that they did not have the
ability to act against such influential actors.
Cat and mouse
A more complex type of interaction between smugglers and state author-
ities may be called Cat and Mouse. In this case, a repeated “game” is
played, in which law enforcement officers try to catch smugglers, who, in
turn, attempt to remain undetected. If the law enforcement officers suc-
ceed, they are rewarded with a payment by the smuggler, often a defined
amount. As in the case of Genuine Enforcement, law enforcement officers
attempt to detect smuggling while smugglers attempt to evade law enforce-
ment. However, in contrast to that ideal type, detection does not necessar-
ily result in the full application of the law but may result in a bribe
payment. Hence, detection is costly for the smuggler. State representatives’
role is not understood as intended to eliminate the smuggling activity
altogether, and the interaction contains an equilibrium state in which
smuggling is prevalent.
As with the Toleration ideal type, this does not describe a case of
Genuine Enforcement, and there is an acceptance on an aggregate level by
state agents that smuggling occurs and that smugglers are not pursued out-
side of the “game.” However, in contrast to the Toleration ideal type, this
model imposes a cost on smugglers through a nonzero probability of cap-
ture/payment and repeat interaction. In this aspect, it is similar to the Flat
Rate ideal type. But the interaction has less day-to-day predictability and
hence presents a barrier of entry not only based on cost but also on risk
aversion. Nonetheless, this type of smuggler–state interaction ensures a
high level of predictability for smugglers on a macro level, as the rules are
clearly defined and smugglers can include the costs for a certain number of
detections in their monthly transportation costs. Furthermore, Flat Rate
necessitates a certain knowledge of the actors to be able to identify those
who have already paid or are covered by a specific payment. Conversely,
the Cat and Mouse ideal type does not require such knowledge.
25Sajidul Haque and Shankar Barua, “Bangladesh MP Badi and Family Involved in Yaba Trade,” Bdnews24.com, 5
May 2014.
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The border between Tunisia and Libya provides a particularly fitting
example of this kind of model. Outside the few formal points of entry, the
border runs through hundreds of miles of difficult terrain, across deserts
and mountains. Smugglers hailing from small villages near the border cross
it by night in powerful 4x4s, stocking up on tea, cigarettes, or gasoline in
Libya and then driving back into Tunisia. The reason for the strong cars is
not just the difficulty of the terrain, but a nightly game of cat and mouse
with the local customs officers, who are waiting in their own powerful jeeps
along the border. If a smuggler manages to avoid them, they are home
free. If they get caught, they face paying a stiff bribe, but, crucially, they
are not arrested. The next night, the game begins anew. The actors know
each other, and one of the most popular smuggler cafes sits just across
from the local customs office; the powerful cars that chase across the desert
at night are parked side by side during the day. There is no systematic
effort on the side of the customs authorities to eliminate the trade, and
there are few arrests or raids on storage facilities. Custom officials who do
not participate in the game are swiftly convinced to participate or trans-
ferred. And while the nightly trip through the border’s difficult terrain
bears real risks for the young men who drive the cars, the costs of an occa-
sional bribe have been calculated into the profit margins of the larger
wholesale smugglers who employ the drivers.
Petty corruption
Finally, state–smuggler interactions may be characterized by what is com-
monly called Petty Corruption. It describes an interaction where some state
representatives tolerate some smuggling activity in exchange for a bribe.
Hence, just like Genuine Enforcement, Petty Corruption closely resembles
the state–smuggler interaction as it is imagined in much of the mainstream
literature. However, in contrast to the Flat Rate ideal type, this practice is
not regulated. It results in a low level of predictability for smugglers, as the
relevant state official, the willingness of that official to forgo enforcement
in exchange for a bribe, and the form and level of that bribe may all vary.
As structured repeated interactions are not always ensured, corrupt state
officials may have an incentive to set bribes at predatory levels. But con-
trary to the Cat and Mouse ideal type, no clear expectation exists on both
sides of what happens in the case of detection. The barrier to entry is struc-
tured around the ability to bear the costs of bribes, not around access.
However, the inability to calculate the costs makes the Petty Corruption
model unattractive for professional smugglers.
For instance, police checkpoints that smugglers of licit goods in Tunisia
pass as they transport their goods further into the country commonly fit
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this type. Corruption is widespread—most smugglers pass through the
checkpoints with their goods after paying the officers. The payments are
relatively unpredictable, however, because personal connections to individ-
ual members of the security services, or changes in the rotation, can make
a crucial difference. Local smugglers commonly complain about this lack of
predictability—an observation shared by Ahmad’s account of smuggling in
Afghanistan in the pre-Taliban period.26
Table 1 below summarizes the interactions described in this section by
highlighting their differences with reference to three aspects. The first is
how predictable the interaction is for both smuggler and state agents; the
second is whether bribes are necessary and whether their amount can be
anticipated by smugglers beforehand; and the third refers to whether smug-
glers try to evade detection as a part of this interaction.
Choosing routes
A clear set of questions emerge from this variety of interactions: What
shapes these interactions? Who drives their emergence? And why do smug-
glers—and states—engage with them? As we are building here from the
empirical observation of these patterned interactions, we do not aim to
provide a complete model of their origins, which would require further
research, as suggested in the conclusion. Alongside the borderlands’
extended geography, local histories of border-making, historical institu-
tional path dependencies, and local normative conceptions of smuggling,
Table 1. Typology of state–smuggler interactions.
Interaction Bribes Evasion
Genuine Enforcement  Both detection and successful
evasion possible
 Severe uncertainty for all actors about
which one will happen
 Clarity on the consequences of each
Bribes not possible Yes
Toleration  Only one possible form of interaction
 Clarity on the consequences
Bribes not necessary No
Flat Rate  Only one possible form of interaction




State as Smuggler N/A Bribes not necessary No
Cat and Mouse  Both detection and successful
evasion possible
 Severe uncertainty for all actors about
which one will happen





Petty Corruption  Only one possible form of interaction




26Ahmad, Jihad & Co.
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the preferences of both smugglers and state representatives over different
interactions clearly play a role. To support our argument that states shape
smuggling routes, we focus here on outlining three related observations.
First, the type of interaction available will affect the routes that smuggling
networks choose. Second, the type of interaction networks choose will dif-
fer among networks depending on their features. And third, smuggling net-
works do not exclusively drive the types of interaction available—they are
affected by states.
Naturally, smuggling networks’ motivations and practices are diverse and
cannot be reduced to their interactions with states alone. However, clearly
the different interactions between state structures and smugglers sketched
above have heterogeneous consequences for the day-to-day business opera-
tions of smuggling networks. They differ with respect to the predictability
of their interaction with state agents, the costs of these interactions, and
the access to these interactions. It follows naturally that depending on their
resources, goods, business models, connections, and capital, smuggling net-
works have different preferences over these features.
The dynamics outlined above, for example, suggest that the costliness of
the interaction with state structures provides diverging incentives for smug-
gling networks depending on their profit margins and access to capital.
Small-scale survivalist activities based in the borderlands will likely prefer
routes that approximate the Toleration ideal type. Due to their embedded-
ness in local social networks, they may be able to operate in environments
that approximate the Petty Corruption ideal type, whereas they would
avoid more expensive environments such as the Flat Rate. More affluent
networks, however, may prefer more expensive interactions if they bring
additional benefits, such as the use of state-provided trade infrastructure,
predictability, or the elimination of competition.
The responsiveness of different networks to the varying costs of different
interactions will also depend on the costs of evasion—or the difficulty with
which they can avoid detection. Networks that can avoid detection at rela-
tively low costs, such as networks smuggling narcotics in the body of trans-
porters, may prefer a Genuine Enforcement or a Cat and Mouse context,
which would be substantially less attractive to networks that face much
higher costs of evasion, such as those smuggling heavy artillery.
The predictability of their interaction with state structures also affects
networks heterogeneously. Networks trading in very high-value goods but
with a lower frequency of border crossings, such as cocaine trafficking net-
works, would have a significantly lower tolerance for uncertainty than net-
works trading lower-value goods, such as gasoline, in higher frequency. It
is important, however, to conceptualize predictability wider than merely
the likelihood of unexpected confiscation or the likelihood of paying a
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higher cost than originally anticipated. Unpredictability in the context of
smuggling can also have a wider influence on people’s lives and well-being.
Predictability of interactions with state structures commonly correlates with
the social normalization and legitimization of illegal economic activity in
the borderlands. This can affect traders’ social standing in local commun-
ities, their own career choices and preferences, and hence preferred cargo
and routes.
Different forms of interaction between state structures and smuggling
networks also have heterogeneous effects on the barriers to entry to the
interaction, and hence affect the market concentration within the specific
smuggling segment. The complete toleration of specific trades limits bar-
riers to entry, and even actively counteracts a concentration of market
power if it also includes maximum quantities that can be smuggled in a
given trip. In contrast, Flat Rate interactions raise barriers to entry rela-
tive to the costs of the interaction, whereas State as Smuggler interac-
tions typically include a complete monopolization of the trade.
Naturally, the preferences of networks regarding barriers to entry are
highly differentiated. They differ depending on the likelihood of a spe-
cific network being able to overcome the barrier and the additional
profit that can be generated out of a higher market concentration. For a
network trading in illegal narcotics, a Toleration interaction is less
attractive than a Genuine Enforcement interaction if profit margins are
primarily related to market concentration and the cost of evasion from
rivals. The costs of interactions with state structures, the predictability of
these interactions, and the market concentration all have direct and sig-
nificant influence on smuggling enterprises.
We have focused primarily on smuggling networks’ preferences over dif-
ferent interactions as a consequence of their business model and cost–risk
trade-offs because these point to some of the clearest variation between
networks outside of their local contexts. However, these are likely not the
only factors: local moral economies, normative conceptions both of smug-
glers and the communities they live in, traditions of mobility, the presence
of other nonstate regulatory actors, or political ties could all similarly shape
networks’ preferences. For example, normative perceptions about the per-
missibility of bribery could drive smugglers’ preferences to opt for
Toleration structures. At the same time, networks that see the state as an
illegitimate actor that must not be collaborated with could purposefully
avoid Toleration interactions. Similarly, perceptions about the impermissi-
bility of trading certain goods could drive some networks to choose a dif-
ferent form of interaction than neighboring networks.
What follows from the above discussion is also that smuggling networks’
preferences over what forms of interaction to engage with correlates with
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the types of goods they smuggle. Some illicit goods, such as narcotics or
arms, for example, typically face substantially higher penalties in a Genuine
Enforcement environment, which likely makes this less attractive.
Depending on the environment, goods also differ in the costs and difficulty
of evasion depending on their size and detectability—gold is much more
easily stashed in the wheels of a car than a goat would be. Perishable goods
such as meat, fruits, and vegetables also put time pressures on networks.
That said, we suspect the relationship between goods traded and the prefer-
ence for particular forms of interaction will remain somewhat imprecise.
This is primarily due to the diversity of networks trading in many goods.
Some gasoline smuggling networks, for example, are small scale and surviv-
alist in scope; others are highly capitalized wholesale operations, which we
would expect to have rather different preferences.
None of the discussions above seek to imply that networks always choose
routes—that they always have choices available, that they always make this
choice, or that there are no (literal) path dependencies. But it seeks to high-
light that in contexts where choices are being made, the interaction
between smugglers and state structures is a crucial aspect. To argue that
states play a role in shaping smuggling routes, it is worth noting that these
interactions are not purely created or shaped by smugglers, that state actors
play a role in shaping these relationships. Naturally, this points to a ques-
tion of what motivates state interactions with smugglers. Although a full
discussion on the topic goes beyond the scope of this paper, recent work
both in political science and borderland studies, as well as some of the lit-
erature on “state criminality,” have offered a variety of starting points to
explore these questions.
More traditional explanations for state agent involvement in illegal activ-
ities have foregrounded financial gain as a motive, and thus frequently tend
to assume structures that mirror our Petty Corruption ideal type.27 Other
scholarship has noted how distributional politics and a need to provide
incomes for otherwise neglected regions can lead states to tolerate smug-
gling, or how political acquiescence can lead to the toleration of other
illegal economic activities.28 Assuring domestic supply of goods on which
trade restrictions exist can also motivate states to get more directly involved
in smuggling: scholarship on smuggling between a divided Germany, for
example, showed the involvement of high levels of the German Democratic
Republic security services in importing rare goods.29 It is also worth noting
27Sheldon X. Zhang and Samuel L. Pineda, “Corruption as a Causal Factor in Human Trafficking,” in Organized
Crime: Culture, Markets and Policies, ed. Dina Siegel and Hans Nelen (New York: Springer, 2008), 41–55.
28Alisha C. Holland, “The Distributive Politics of Enforcement,” American Journal of Political Science 59, no. 2
(April 2015): 357–71; Max Gallien, “Smugglers and States.”
29J€orn-Michael Goll, Kontrollierte Kontrolleure: Die Bedeutung der Zollverwaltung f€ur die “Politisch Operative Arbeit”
des Ministeriums f€ur Staatssicherheit der DDR [Inspected Inspectors: The Function of the Customs Administration
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that states are not always most productively analyzed as unitary actors but
may reflect different strategies and preferences with respect to smuggling
within different parts of the state apparatus. Naturally, a dynamic relation-
ship also exists between the preferences smuggling networks may have for
certain interactions and the preferences of state structures. However, a
more systematic discussion of this would require a separate study.
From the considerations suggested in this section, we can offer an
explanation for the puzzle presented at the beginning of the paper. In all
borderlands studied in this project, most smuggling activity has been con-
ducted through points of entry, where smugglers’ ability to avoid detection
is significantly reduced in comparison to “green border” territories. The
relationships outlined above suggest smugglers choose to operate through
border crossings. Border crossings not only provide advantages in terms of
infrastructure; they can also offer advantages in terms of costs, predictabil-
ity, social respectability, and market concentration. Which forms of net-
works operate through border crossings and which work around them,
then, is crucially determined by the form of state–smuggling interaction at
the border crossing.
Choosing routes: Two case studies
To illustrate some of the dynamics described above, we sketch out the
geographies of interaction between smugglers and states along two borders
and highlight how different networks choose their routes.
The Tunisia-Libya border
The northern section of Tunisia’s border with Libya offers two different
terrains for smugglers. One is the main point of entry, the Ras Jedir border
crossing. The other is the terrain south of the border, a wild landscape of
deserts, dry lakes, and mountains, which locals navigate with powerful
4x4s. We find significant smuggling activities across both terrains. We
argue that different networks’ taken route is critically influenced by the dif-
ferent interactions with state structures. Here, it is important to highlight,
as we have noted above, that different interactions can overlap across the
same terrain.30
First, there is a layer of Genuine Enforcement that spans across both
routes but is limited to specific goods. Anyone trying to bring cocaine or
29 for the “Political Operative Work” of the Ministry for State Security in the GDR] (G€ottingen: Vandenhoeck &
Ruprecht, 2011).
30Smuggling routes, practices, and interactions are seldom static. This description largely maps the dynamics on
this border between 2011 and 2017, before a restructuring of the borderland infrastructure, alongside the war
in Libya, shifted these dynamics.
20 M. GALLIEN AND F. WEIGAND
weapons across either route would typically expect to encounter a Genuine
Enforcement environment, albeit individual instances of Petty Corruption
may occur. On top of this, we can identify at least two more interactions at
the border crossing. We find complete toleration for traders bringing in
most licit goods as long as they remain under a certain value threshold per
crossing—typically a full tank of gasoline, a few carpets, and a few home
appliances. For larger quantities of licit goods, a Flat Rate agreement is in
place, where traders pay a fixed fee per crossing, which is then divided
between customs officers on the Tunisian side of the crossing and customs
officers and local security forces on the Libyan side. Outside of the border
crossing, we find the Cat and Mouse game described earlier, where traders
crossing the desert in 4x4s by night often manage to avoid security forces
but must pay a hefty bribe on the nights when they do get caught.
Interspersed across this space are smaller elements of Petty Corruption.
Bribes at police checkpoints are common but not standardized, and a com-
mon practice among customs officials at the border crossings involves the
artificial creation of traffic jams that smugglers can bypass for a fee.
As smugglers of different goods operate through both routes, the differ-
ent interactions offer key insights into why they do so. For example, the
smuggling of illicit goods, such as drugs and arms, primarily occurs outside
the border crossing. This is intuitive, as the same interaction—Genuine
Enforcement—applies for illicit goods on both routes, but evasion is easier
outside the border crossing. Among those trading licit goods, route choices
are more diverse. Small-scale traders of licit goods with low levels of capital
typically operate through the border crossing, as the Toleration agreement
there provides predictability and low costs. Its profit margins, however, are
also limited. As a result, traders in licit goods with higher capital endow-
ments, less risk averseness, or higher profit margins often operate outside
the border crossings. Although some high-value licit goods, such as phones,
are typically smuggled outside the crossing, some commodities appear on
both routes. For example, small quantities of gasoline are smuggled through
the border crossing under the Toleration agreement, but traders with access
to powerful 4x4s can bring across thousands of liters at a time.
The Thailand-Malaysia border
In Narathiwat Province, at the Thailand-Malaysia border, our research
shows smugglers have three main options for crossing the border. They use
one of the bridges over the border river Golok and pass the official check-
points, they cross the river with a small irregular boat, or they cross the
mountains further inland. Our analysis suggests that territory and the type
of smuggler–state interaction determine the smugglers’ choice.
CHANNELING CONTRABAND 21
The official border crossings, positioned at bridges across the river, tend
to be only used for small-scale smuggling of licit goods. Our interviewees
explained this by pointing to the high likelihood of being checked, as
Genuine Enforcement happens here, and the availability of easier alterna-
tives. However, according to residents on both sides of the border, the
smuggling of small amounts of goods for personal consumption or to sup-
ply small shops is tolerated. For instance, people from Thailand do exten-
sive shopping in Malaysia and refill petrol for cheaper prices there before
driving back home.
Similarly, the mountain crossing is not a particularly popular route, as
smugglers explained in our interviews. While there is little enforcement in
the mountains, the area is difficult to cross due to a lack of infrastructure,
including roads. In addition, there is an ongoing violent conflict in the
deep south of Thailand, and the mountains often serve as hideouts for
insurgents. Such routes, however, have been used to traffic and exploit peo-
ple. In Songkhla Province, further west along the Thailand-Malaysia border,
mass graves were found in 2015. Refugees and migrant workers from
Myanmar, who wanted to reach Malaysia, were held hostage and tortured
there for ransom.31 Those who died were buried locally. In the months fol-
lowing the discovery of the mass graves, more than a hundred people from
Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Thailand were arrested, including one Thai
army general and fifteen other Thai state officials. For groups like this, who
are looking for seclusion rather than a quick transit route, the mountain
route is the preferred option. Meanwhile, however, the network also bene-
fited from being close to the state, enabling it to conduct such a high-risk
and high-value business.
Finally, however, the most used smuggling route is via small boats that
take people and goods across Golok River, near the official border cross-
ings. Here, as we observed, large quantities of licit goods, such as cooking
oil, cigarettes, and T-shirts, as well as illicit goods, such as drugs, are
smuggled across the border with small boats. The advantage of this route is
good transportation links, as the river can be easily accessed via roads on
both sides of the border, which connect the area with other parts of
Thailand and Malaysia, as a drug smuggler explained. Different options for
smuggler–state interactions exist here, making it the best available route for
most smugglers. As outlined before, big businesses have Flat Rate deals
with state officials, enabling them to operate with fixed costs and a high
level of predictability. Even though many businesses operate on the same
basis, making market concentration low, the smuggling is profitable
because of the large amounts and the different types of goods that can be
31See, for example, Oliver Holmes, “Thailand Convicts Traffickers after 2015 Mass Graves Discovery,” Guardian, 19
July 2017.
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transported. At the same time, state authorities usually tolerate individuals
crossing the border and conduct no passport checks. However, some infor-
mal practices have been established. For instance, Thai authorities often
collect the ID cards of Malaysians who come to Thailand in the evenings
to drink, as the Malaysian province bordering Narathiwat is dry, and only
return them when those crossing take the boat back to Malaysia.
Implications
The analysis and considerations detailed above have several wider implica-
tions for discussions on smuggling and the state. Here, we discuss three of
these implications in more detail, connecting them to existing discussions
in the literature.
Active conflict zones are not attractive transit routes for smugglers
Much of the contemporary policy literature on smuggling is driven by the
idea that conflict zones present unique opportunities for smuggling net-
works. The literature on “war economies” illustrates how today’s violent
conflicts can often be described as mutual enterprises in which the involved
parties have little interest to stop fighting, as they economically benefit
from ongoing violence.32 War economies rely heavily on the smuggling of
goods across international borders and borders demarcating zones con-
trolled by different armed actors. For instance, conflict zones are the des-
tination of many licit smuggled goods, as people in such areas often are cut
off from supplies or have little access to goods. Hence, many people rely
on smuggled goods for survival, creating a profitable business for smug-
glers.33 Furthermore, conflict zones are the source of many illicit smuggled
goods, such as guns and, in some cases, drugs.34
Even though a high level of smuggling activities certainly exists in con-
flict zones, financing armed groups and possibly even ensuring the survival
of affected populations, our analysis suggests such areas are unpopular
transit routes for smugglers.35 This finding matches that of scholars such as
Justin V. Hastings,36 illustrating that this analysis is likely to have validity
32See, for example, Kaldor, New and Old Wars and Keen, Complex Emergencies.
33See, for example, Rim Turkmani, “ISIL, JAN and the War Economy in Syria,” Security in Transition Report (30
July 2015): 1–27.
34See, for example, Jonathan Goodhand, “Bandits, Borderlands and Opium Wars: Afghan State-Building Viewed
from the Margins” (DIIS working paper 2009:26, Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen,
2009), 1–28.
35See also Weigand, Conflict and Transnational Crime.
36Justin V. Hastings, No Man’s Land: Globalization, Territory, and Clandestine Groups in Southeast Asia (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 2010).
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beyond the contexts explored in our research.37 We suggest that conflict
zones are only attractive to smuggling groups if they can provide interac-
tions with local security providers that are more attractive than alternative
routes. However, conflict zones are less likely to provide these interactions,
as force is often not monopolized and smugglers must negotiate with mul-
tiple authorities and security forces. This analysis is not limited to state
structures; it can be extended to nonstate groups that possess some form of
territorial control. Each interaction we identify can therefore be replicated
with rebel groups, insurgents, or other militias that control sections of a
border. However, a group’s ability to provide an attractive interaction for
smugglers in terms of cost, predictability, and the ability to sustain a cer-
tain form of market concentration decreases as their territorial control
becomes more contested. Hence, we suggest there are good reasons to
believe established professional smuggling networks tend to prefer routes in
which they have to interact and negotiate with as few authorities as pos-
sible, avoiding areas of violent conflict.
The effectiveness of changes in state capacity depends on the
interaction type
Driven by the discussed dominant understanding that states’ inability to
prevent smuggling is the result of limited state capacity,38 contemporary
approaches toward combating smuggling across the globe heavily rely on
programs designed to increase state enforcement capacity.39 These typically
involve the training of border agents or the installation of additional secur-
ity infrastructure, thereby either increasing border guards’ ability to detect
smuggled goods at points of entry or making it more costly for smugglers
to cross “green borders” outside points of entry. President Donald Trump’s
advocacy for a wall at the US–Mexico border probably is the most promin-
ent example of such initiatives. We suggest that these policy interventions
are largely based on the assumption that the dominant interaction type
between smugglers and state officials is Genuine Enforcement or low-level
Petty Corruption, and that smuggling is primarily conducted outside of
points of entry, or through the avoidance of detection within points of
entry. We suggest that both assumptions are empirically untrue. Based on
37For a further discussion of smuggling in conflict zones in Southeast Asia, see Weigand, Conflict and
Transnational Crime.
38For a comprehensive discussion of smuggling and state building in the case of China, see Philip Thai, China’s
War on Smuggling: Law, Economic Life and the Making of the Modern State, 1845–1965 (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2018).
39For example, see US Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Drug Control Strategy: Southwest Border
Counternarcotic Strategy 2020 (Washington, DC: US Office of National Drug Control Policy, February 2020),
which states that “the United States must build the capacity of Mexican counterparts to more effectively
partner on counter-TCO [transnational criminal organization] operations between POEs [ports of entry]” (5).
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the analysis outlined above we can make three statements about state
capacity–building measures.
First, anti-corruption training for lower-level border security officials, if
in fact genuinely effective in decreasing the willingness of selected officials
to engage in corruption, is only going to be successful in reducing overall
smuggling quantities conditional upon the wider environment of state–s-
muggling interactions along the border. In areas where State as Smuggler
dominates, these measures likely are of negligible effect. In areas where
Petty Corruption dominates, this may either decrease volumes or incentiv-
ize smugglers to move toward a different form of interaction, such as by
approaching higher state officials to institute a Flat Rate interaction. In all
areas, the effect of these measures on the cost of smuggling may lead to a
reorientation of smuggling routes.
Second, improvements in surveillance infrastructure at points of entry
such as scanners or better-trained personnel only have an effect on smug-
gling volumes if avoidance of detection is a significant part of the current
interaction. Third, border infrastructure that makes crossing “green” bor-
ders more expensive for smugglers, such as walls and fences, only have a
significant effect on smuggling volumes if trade is primarily conducted
through points of entry. By raising the costs of transport outside points of
entry, the construction of walls also incentivizes actors to shift routes
toward points of entry and raises the costs actors are willing to pay to
either engage in certain forms of interactions at border crossings (such as
Petty Corruption or Flat Rate) or to transform the dominant interaction at
ports of entry into one of these forms. As a result, we suggest that the con-
struction of border infrastructure along “green” borders likely increases
corruption at border crossings.
Violence is primarily driven by changes in the interaction
One of the most noteworthy aspects of the interactions we outline above,
and of the practice of smuggling we have observed in borderlands across
North Africa and Southeast Asia, is that they involve remarkably little
amounts of violence in their day-to-day operation. Most interactions dis-
cussed here are built on stable expectations on both sides, as well as repeat
interaction, and do not necessitate violence. Based on our analysis, we sug-
gest that violence is primarily observed in the context of smuggling at
moments of transformation from one form of interaction to another, or as
one or multiple actors attempt to force a change in the interaction. We
also posit that the likelihood of violence is particularly high in changes that
affect market concentrations.
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Tunisia’s border with Algeria presents an example here. While the smug-
gling operations at that border were largely controlled through networks
connected to the former dictator Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, these collapsed
when his regime fell in 2011. Widespread occurrences of violence across
this border after 2011 have commonly been connected to a lack of clarity
among the actors about the new power structures and interactions.40 Here,
our observation largely follows similar conclusions in recent research on
the relationship between smuggling and violence.41
Bringing the state back in
By examining some of smugglers’ considerations when choosing routes for
crossing borders, the article has illustrated that their relationship with state
actors is a key factor. Here, the costs and conditions of evasion or side pay-
ments, the predictability and respectability of their interaction with the
state, the availability of trade infrastructure—all are typically more signifi-
cant factors for determining costs than geographical considerations. Hence,
in contrast to a common perception, smuggling does not just happen in
remote areas. To the contrary, many types of smuggling activities are much
more prominent at official border crossings and easy-to-access stretches
of borders.
Building on our empirical research, we developed six ideal types that
describe smuggler–state relations. We have also noted that each has specific
implications for smuggling networks and often benefits certain types of
smugglers. For instance, small-scale occasional smugglers prefer Petty
Corruption, but this is unattractive for professional smugglers who prefer a
higher level of predictability. Meanwhile, Flat Rate models with higher bar-
riers to entry can exclude small-scale smugglers and benefit professional
smugglers. These considerations have implications for several related and
more applied debates.
First, they contribute to disentangling the notion of “corruption.”
Corruption often features as a dominant analytical lens in contemporary
writing on smuggling, especially in security studies. Conversely, this paper
suggests that the concept of corruption in a smuggling context is of limited
analytical power. “Corrupt” state–smuggler interaction has various forms,
each having specific implications for smugglers, the state, and routes.
Furthermore, our analysis shows that the type of corruption most associ-
ated with smuggling in the common imaginary—Petty Corruption—is a
type of interaction many smugglers consciously avoid.
40Querine Hanlon and Matthew M. Herbert, “Border Security Challenges in the Grand Maghreb,” Peaceworks 109
(May 2015): 1–48.
41Jonathan Goodhand, “Corrupting or Consolidating the Peace? The Drugs Economy and Post-Conflict
Peacebuilding in Afghanistan,” International Peacekeeping 15, no. 3 (June 2008): 405–23.
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Second, the findings illustrate that common policy interventions aimed
at addressing smuggling and transnational crime fail to respond to the
underlying problems. For instance, capacity building is a popular develop-
ment policy that aims at enhancing state capacity. However, our findings
show smuggling often happens in border areas where state capacity is high-
est. Hence, enhancing state capacity runs the risk of simply increasing the
costs for smugglers when interacting with the state.
Third, this paper systematizes a variety of different conceptualizations of
the state–smuggling relationship, highlighting not only their relevance for
the choice of smuggling routes but also their heterogeneous effects on mar-
ket structures among smuggling networks. State–smuggler interactions not
only shape smuggling routes but also influence what kind of networks can
be successful within a certain environment. Consequently, they likely also
affect dynamics between smuggling networks, organizational structures, and
the relationship of networks with local populations.
Our findings show that the politics of smuggling and the interaction
between smugglers and states should take a more prominent place in the
study of both smuggling and border fortifications. Here, there is significant
room for future research, not just for scholars of illicit economies but also
for those interested in international security. In particular, further research
could help develop a more nuanced understanding of the motivations and
considerations that drive both smugglers and state actors. While many of
our discussions here have focused on the cost–risk calculations of smug-
gling networks, more context-dependent factors, such as local normative
perceptions, local histories of border-making, and state–society relation-
ships all deserve further analysis both in the context of smuggling networks
and ideal types. In addition, it would be worth exploring whether add-
itional ideal types exist that may describe state–smuggler interactions. As
we have focused here on these interactions from the perspectives of smug-
glers, additional research on the perspective of state institutions toward
these interactions, as well as unpacking the notion of state capacity in this
context, could be particularly fruitful.
Finally, while we have focused here on an analysis of different interac-
tions and their effects on how smuggling networks choose routes, signifi-
cant scope remains for additional work on how these interactions evolve
over time. As we have outlined, there are diverse sets of motivations both
for different smuggling networks and different state actors to prefer or tol-
erate different forms of interactions. While these are likely critical aspects
of generating and maintaining such interactions, they need to be consid-
ered alongside the historical and institutional context in which they oper-
ate. Crucially, there is a question of which institutional and contextual
factors shape the relative power of different actors—both between states
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and smugglers and between different smuggling networks—to influence
these interactions and set the terms for how smuggling can be conducted.
This also connects more directly to questions around the wider political
economy of smuggling. In particular, the observations presented here note
that the interests between smaller survivalist networks and highly capitalized,
politically connected networks frequently need to be differentiated and that
the role of other actors who maintain an interest in the global formal trade
infrastructure and the global bordering industry should also not be neglected.
This is sharpened by the fact that these interactions are likely dynamic over
time. As we describe here, certain types of interactions set the context for
the emergence of more monopolistic structures among smuggling networks,
which in turn may then have a different capacity to influence their interac-
tions with state agents than previous networks. In the long term, then, states
shape not only smuggling routes, but also smuggling networks—which may
end up shaping states themselves.
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